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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

because the levels of Atrazine in each system never violated the
mandates of the Safe Drinking Water Act. The court reasoned that
there was no harm because the EPA only required water systems to
meet an annualized average for Atrazine levels. Thus, the fact that the
Iberville Parish system experienced peaks each spring that exceeded
regulation levels did not amount to an injury. In addition, the Water
Systems could not show that there was any imminent danger of
Atrazine exceeding these yearly limits.
The court also found no harm with respect to testing raw water.
EPA regulations did not require raw water testing for Atrazine, only
pre-distribution testing. Iberville Parish did not pay for the Atrazine
testing on its raw water, and Bowling Green voluntarily tested its water
to determine which source to draw from, not just to determine
Atrazine levels. Therefore, because there was no EPA mandate to test,
the Water Systems suffered no injury.
Finally, the Water Systems argued their claims should stand by
virtue of the jurisprudential tradition allowing pre-enforcement suits
to enjoin statutory enforcement. The court held that such actions
could be entertained only when three conditions were met: (1) where
the constitutionality of the statute was put in issue; (2) where plaintiffs
were under a concrete threat of prosecution under the statute; and (3)
where there was strong public interest in resolving the constitutionality
of the statute before enforcement. The Water Systems met none of
these conditions. The Water Systems could not show their claims were
ripe for adjudication. As an alternative holding, the court stated that
even if the Water Systems had standing to sue, their claims were not
ripe because they were based upon contingent and speculative future
events.
Susan P. Klopman

United States v. Massachusetts Water Resources Auth., 48 F.Supp.2d
65 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that the utility violated the Safe Drinking
Water Act and the EPA's Surface Water Treatment Rule).
In 1974, Congress passed the Safe Water Drinking Act ("SWDA").
The SWDA charged the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") with the overall responsibility for protecting the
nation's public water supply. A 1986 amendment to the SDWA
reflected Congress' judgment that filtration was the best technology
for removing bacterial and viral contaminants from water. The EPA
later promulgated drinking water regulations, referred to as the
Surface Water Treatment Rule ("SWTR"). The "self-implementing"
SWTR required non-compliant water systems to install treatment
facilities by June 29, 1993. The issue in this case was whether or not
the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority ("MWRA") violated the
SWDA and the SWTR by not implementing filtration technology and
continuing to operate its facilities using another method.
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While the lead role in ensuring the safety of public drinking water
belongs to the EPA, Congress also intended that the states participate
in the enforcement process. The Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection ("MDEP") provides that either a state
filtration determination or a failure of the water system to meet one or
more of the filtration avoidance criteria triggers the filtration
requirement.
The MDEP and the MWRA negotiated an administrative consent
order to achieve compliance with the SWTR. The final agreement
required that the MWRA prepare a watershed protection plan, and
implement other measures intended to bring the MWRA's system
within the filtration avoidance criteria. The MWRA sought to use an
ozonation method of water treatment, but agreed to comply with the
filtration requirement after a period of time. The SWTR specifies the
appropriate treatment technique by its terms. Therefore, treatment
facilities must use filtration.
The MWRA sought to use only the ozonation technique and thus
delayed the installation of a filtration method. After many years of
waiting for the MWRA to convert its systems to filtration, and because
the testing done on the MWRA's water showed that it exceeded fecal
coliform concentrations, the EPA brought this action to order the
MWRA to begin filtering its water and to impose statutory damages.
The court found that the SDWA does not deprive a court of
discretion in fashioning remedies for a violation of the SWTR.
However, it held that the MWRA is presently in violation of the
filtration avoidance criteria of the SWTR as the agency suggested, and
scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the appropriate form of relief to
be awarded to the United States.
Melody Divine

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. National Semiconductor Corp., 38
F.Supp.2d 802 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that in Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA") initial contribution action, the applicable limitation
period is the limitation period set out in the provision foe cost recovery
action, the question of whether action can be characterized as removal
or remedial is one of law appropriate for resolution on summary
judgment, causes of action for contribution for clean up costs brought
under state law claims accrue at the same time as CERC[A
contribution claims, actions for negligence for property damage due
to hazardous waste contamination accrue when plaintiff discovers the
injury and its cause, and award of attorney fees under the California
private attorney general action provision is improper where the
primary effect of the lawsuit is to advance or vindicate plaintiffs
personal economic interest).

